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ABSTRACT 
This study presents an attempt to investigate the impact of exchange rate 
misalignment on capital inflows in Malaysia.  Specifically, a precise threshold value 
is estimated to examine when exchange rate misalignment suppresses capital inflows.  
To pursue these objectives, this study relies on the endogenous threshold analysis as 
of Hansen (1996, 2000).  Results suggest that misalignment in terms of currency 
overvaluation, has a negative and significant effect when overvaluation is more than 
15 percent.  This estimate is consistent and robust despite the changes in the choice of 
explanatory variables. 
 
Keywords: Exchange rate misalignment, Capital inflows competitiveness, Threshold 
effect. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has served as an important engine of growth via skills 
and technology transfer, creation of employment opportunities and expanding the 
capital stock in Malaysia. Since the 1997 Asian financial crisis, Malaysia is no longer 
the top 10 host for FDI.  In fact, the rate of growth of FDI has dramatically decrease 
compared to that of the early 1990s.  This is partly due to reverse investment (Mat 
Zin, 1999) and declining dependence on FDI to finance growth.  However, this may 
also indicates the declining competitiveness of Malaysia in attracting FDI which 
warrants empirical research since it would be vital to investigate which factors that 
contributed to the deterioration of competitiveness.  Since early 1980s, real exchange 
rate misalignment has become a standard concept in international macroeconomic 
theory and policy (Razin & Collins, 1997).  Hence, this study focuses on exchange 
rate misalignment as an indicator of capital inflow competitiveness in the case of 
Malaysia.   Malaysia provides an interesting case as it is one of the largest recipients 
of FDI amongst its ASEAN counterparts.  Another advantage of undertaking a single 
country study is the ability to delineate the assumption that countries are similar in 
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terms of social, cultural, economic and political background (Sun et al., 2002).  
Therefore, only relevant economic determinants are accounted for to suit the 
Malaysian environment.   
 
The objective of this paper is to investigate the empirical relationship between capital 
inflows and exchange rate misalignment.  Whilst existing literature focuses on the role 
of exchange rate, this study takes a step further to examine the impact of exchange 
rate misalignment on capital inflows.  Specifically, we estimate a threshold value at 
which misalignment begins to significantly affect capital inflows.  To the best of our 
knowledge, no published study has attempted to estimate a threshold value for 
exchange rate misalignment in Malaysia.  Hence, this study intends to fill this gap.  
Based on the endogenous autoregressive threshold (TAR) model developed by 
Hansen (2000), we split the sample into high and low misalignment regimes.  Results 
suggest that exchange rate misalignment due to overvaluation is detrimental to the 
influx of capital inflows.  The next section provides a brief overview of FDI in 
Malaysia followed by a brief explication of the theoretical model and review of 
literature.  The fourth section spells out the method pertaining to the objective.  The 
penultimate section provides results and discussion and the final section concludes. 
 
CAPITAL INFLOWS IN MALAYSIA: RECENT TRENDS AND INCENTIVES 
The essence of export oriented-growth nexus somewhat depends on the inflow of 
foreign capital into the country.  In the past, foreign direct investment has been the 
one of the major conduit for technology transfer, job creation and export-led growth 
to this country.  To pursue this line of interest, the Malaysian government has 
designed various policies spanning the gamut of industrial specific incentives, 
taxation, and intellectual property protection to infrastructure support.  The company 
tax rate for example has been reduced from 33 percent in 1987 to 27 percent in 2007 
and 26 percent in 2008.  Other tax incentives such as the investment tax allowance, 
tax relief for companies with pioneer status or high technology industries has 
continued until today with more industries be given the relevant status to reap the 
benefits of the incentives.  Most recently, the government has liberalized bumiputera 
equity requirements for 27 sectors to further boost competitiveness. 
 
Figure 1: Capital Inflows into Malaysia (US millions) 
FDI
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Source: UNCTAD (2009) Notes: The components of FDI are equity capital, reinvested earnings and other capital (mainly intra-
company loans).   Data on FDI flows are on a net basis (capital transactions´ credits less debits between direct investors and 
their foreign affiliates). Net decreases in assets (FDI outward) or net increases in liabilities (FDI inward) are recorded as credits 
(recorded with a positive sign in the balance of payments), while net increases in assets or net decreases in liabilities are 
recorded as debits (recorded with a negative sign in the balance of payments). Hence, FDI flows with a negative sign indicate 
that at least one of the three components of FDI (equity capital, reinvested earnings or intra-company loans) is negative and not 
offset by positive amounts of the remaining components. These are instances of reverse investment or disinvestment. 
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With reference to Figure 1, there was a surge in foreign direct investment (FDI) into 
Malaysia in the late 1980s and this trend continued until the onset of the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis.  Another acute slump in the influx of FDI occured in 2001 when the 
economy was in a slight recession but picked up again in 2002 thereafter.  With the 
recent burgeoning world recession following the American sub-mortgage crisis, it is 
expected that FDI will contract again (IMF, 2009).   
 
To capture a more vivid impact of misalignment on capital inflows, this study 
employs quarterly data from Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM – the central bank of 
Malaysia) instead of the UNCTAD data which are annual. Foreign capital inflows or 
investment inflows comprises three items: (i) equity investment, (ii) loans and (iii) 
real estate. Investment consists of equity investment in Malaysia by non-residents, 
loans obtained from non-residents and purchase of real estate in Malaysia by non-
residents but excludes retained earnings (Source: Bank Negara Malaysia, Glossary, 
Monthly Bulletin Statistics January, 2009, p. 186-187).  This study resorts to a 
specific measure of FDI, that is, foreign investment inflows.  Data starts from 
1991:Q1-2008:Q3, partly dictated by availability. 
 
THEORY AND REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
In this study, we rely on the portfolio balance approach to model the determinants of 
foreign capital inflows.  This model has been successfully tested by Goh (2005) for 
Malaysia. Branson (1968) postulates that the proportion of foreign assets (Kf) in a 
given stock of wealth is a function of the domestic and foreign interest rates (i and i*), 
the measure of exchange rate expectation or risk (e) and the stock of wealth (w) 
expressed as: 
 
),*,,( weiif
w
K f =         (1) 
 
Darby et al. (1999), augment this concept of exchange rate risk (e) into exchange rate 
volatility and exchange rate misalignment.   Since this study focuses on the role of 
exchange rate misalignment, we substitute e with misalignment.  Expressing the 
above equation at level yields, 
 
εαααααα ++++++= ZYeiidK f 543210 *     (2) 
 
Focusing on Z, the literature suggests a number of variables that determines capital 
flows.  The enigmatic relationship between FDI and exchange rate nexus has been 
widely examined and most of the discussions root back to the work of Kohlhagen 
(1977), Cushman (1985), Froot and Stein (1991), Goldberg (1993) and Darby et al. 
(1999).    
 
The effect of exchange rate is less straightforward (Benassy-Quere et al., 2001).  The 
mechanisms that exchange rate affects capital inflows can also be viewed via the 
wealth effect channel and the relative production cost channel (Xing, 2006).  A 
devaluation of the currency of the host country makes local cost of production lower 
in terms of foreign currency, hence leading to higher returns from export-oriented 
industries.  As for the wealth effect, a devaluation makes local asset cheaper which 
motivates investors to acquire more.  Kohlhagen (1977) static model postulates that 
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following depreciation in host countries, MNEs will increase their production 
capacity.  In a two period dynamic model, Cushman (1985) suggests that adjusted 
expected real depreciation lowers the production cost which leads to increase in FDI 
flows.  Similarly, Goldberg (1993) illustrates how sectoral profitability, location 
effects, and portfolio and wealth effects are important factors that determine 
investment and their links with exchange rates.  In her theoretical model, the direction 
of investment effects triggered by exchange rate movements is ambiguous, therefore, 
warrants empirical research.  On contrary, in an imperfect information framework, 
Froot and Stein (1991) show that appreciation induces wealth effect of foreign 
investors, thus encouraging foreign investors to acquire more local assets.  
Empirically, there is quite a consensus that a depreciation of the exchange rate in the 
host country leads to a reduction of the FDI (Klein and Rosengren, 1994; Dewenter, 
1995).   
 
There is however, a dearth of studies that empirically examine the relationship 
between FDI and exchange rate misalignment.  Empirical attempts include Benassy-
Quere et al. (2001) who advocate the benefits of depreciation may be offset by 
excessive volatility of the exchange rate. Blonigen (1997) illustrates how currency 
depreciation induces foreign firm to acquire firm-specific assets when markets are 
segmented.  Hasnat (1999) study the impact of misalignment on FDI for five 
developed nations on annual data ranging from 1976-1995.  All of these studies use 
misalignment as a control variable or a counterpart for exchange rate variability and is 
measured by a deviation from the purchasing power parity (PPP) values.  
Furthermore, most of these studies are based on the experiences of industrialized 
economies using panel data analysis framework.  In short, a prolonged misalignment 
may affect long term business decisions as it affects costs.  If the exchange rate is 
overvalued relative to the estimated equilibrium level, investors may acquire more 
domestic assets for future capital gains in host country currency terms (Barrell and 
Pain, 1996).  On the other hand, persistent overvaluation may reduce cost 
competitiveness of production in the host country, especially for export oriented 
products. 
 
Other traditional determinants of FDI can be demarcated into at least two categories – 
micro and macro determinants.  The list of micro-determinants spans from market 
size, growth, labour costs, host government policies, tariffs to trade barriers.  The 
macro-determinants include market size (Chakrabarti, 2001; Farrell et al., 2004; 
Kravis and Lipsey; 1992), openness (Edwards, 1990; Gastanaga et al. 1998; 
Hausmann and Fernandez-Arias, 2000; Aseidu, 2002), rate of inflation (Bajo-Rubia 
and Sosvilla-Rivero, 1994; Urata and Kawai, 2000), government budget, taxes 
(Gastanaga et al., 1998; Wei, 2000) and infrastructure (Wheeler and Mody, 1992; 
Urata and Kawai, 2000).  Financial deepening is also another catalyst for FDI 
(Borensztein et al., 1998).  Liquid liability, private credit and M3 serve as proxies.  
Increase in money supply fuels inflation which increases the cost of production in the 
host country rendering a negative relationship.  However, increments in money supply 
supported by growth or higher productivity indicate increase in future purchasing 
power which can benefit market-seeking FDI.  Finally, the degree of misalignment is 
computed based on the difference between the actual and the hypothetical equilibrium 
exchange rate.  Accordingly, the estimation of the hypothetical equilibrium exchange 
rate relies on the theory advocated by Edwards (1994).  This theory postulates that the 
real exchange rate is a function of several fundamental variables which includes the 
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Balassa-Samuelson effect, trade openness, net foreign assets and government 
spending.  Details are provided in Sidek and Yusoff (2009). 
 
METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
The question of when does misalignment begin to significantly affect capital inflows 
necessitate the existence of a non-linear relationship between these two variables.  
Thus, if such non-linear relationship exists, then it is possible to estimate an inflexion 
point, or a threshold value, at which the sign of misalignment may change or become 
significant.  In the non-linear time series modelling, the threshold autoregressive 
model (TAR) is more popular since it offers a relatively simple specification, 
estimation and interpretation compared to other non-linear models.  The origins of 
TAR models roots back to Tong (1980) where the main idea is to approximate a 
general non-linear autoregressive structure by a threshold autoregession with a small 
number of regimes.  Hansen (1996, 2000) derives the asymptotic distribution of the 
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of the endogeneous threshold parameters 
which is used in this study.  
 
This section explains how equation (2) is estimated to incorporate threshold effect.  
According to Hansen (2000), threshold estimation is the act of splitting the sample 
into two regimes when the threshold value is unknown.  One necessary precondition 
is that the threshold variable must be a continuous variable.   In this study, the 
threshold estimation is carried out by splitting the sample into high misalignment and 
low misalignment regime.  Since misalignment is a continuous variable, TAR model 
would be appropriate to engender the threshold value.  Formally, the two-regime 
threshold regression model takes the form: 
 
ttt exy += '1θ ,  γ≤tq ,      (3) 
 
ttt exy += '2θ ,  γ>tq ,      (4) 
where tq  is the threshold variable which is used to split the sample into two regimes, 
γ  is the threshold value which is unknown and must be estimated, ty  denotes the 
dependent variable (capital inflow), tx  represents a vector of explanatory variables 
and te  is the error term assumed to be white noise and i.i.d.  Note that if the threshold 
value is greater than the threshold variable, equation (3) is estimated and vice versa.  
This allows the regression parameters to change with respect to tq .  In order to write 
equations (3) and (4) in a single equation, a dummy variable is used which is defined 
as }{)( γγ ≤= tqd  where {.} is the indicator function, with d=1 when γ≤tq  and d = 
0, if otherwise;  and set )()( γγ dxx tt = , such that (3) and (4) becomes: 
 
ttntt exxy ++= )(' ' γδθ        (5) 
 
where 2θθ =  and 21 θθδ −= .  Equation (5) allows all the regression parameters θ , 
nδ  and γ  to be estimated and switch between the two regimes.  The least square (LS) 
technique is used to estimate γ  through minimization of the sum of squared errors 
function.  To implement this, the model is expressed in matrix notation, hence, 
equation (5) is expressed as: 
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eXXY n ++= δθ γ         (6) 
 
Define, 
 
)()'(),,( δθδθγδθ γγ XXYXXYSn −−−−=     (7) 
 
as the sum of squared error function.  By definition the least squares estimators 
γδθ ˆ,ˆ,ˆ  which is also the MLE when te  with i.i.d. , jointly minimize equation (7).  
This minimization process requires γ  to be restricted to a bounded set Γ=],[ γγ .  
The concentrated sum of squared errors function is written as: 
 
YXXXXYYYSS nn
*'1**'* )('')),(ˆ),(ˆ()( γγγγγγδγθγ −−==    (8) 
 
where γˆ  is the value that minimizes )(γnS .  As )(γnS  takes values that is less than n, 
γˆ  is uniquely described as: 
 
)(minargˆ γγ nS=   with nΓ∈γ       (9) 
 
Focusing on the objective of this section, the first step is to examine whether there 
exist a threshold effect in the model.  This requires the examination between the linear 
model vis-à-vis the two-regime model, equation (5).  The null hypothesis of no 
threshold effect is tested against an alternative hypothesis where threshold effect is 
present.  Since TAR models have a non-standard distribution, Hansen (1997, 2000) 
develops a standard heteroscedasticity-consistent Langrange Multiplier (LM) 
bootstrap method to calculate the asymptotic critical value and the p-value.   
 
The second step is to examine whether the derived threshold value )(γ is statistically 
significant.  This is done by differencing the confidence interval region based on the 
likelihood ratio statistic )(γnLR .  Based on Hansen (2000), let C represent the desired 
asymptotic confidence interval (in this study at 95%) and )(Ccc ξ=  be the C-level 
critical value and set { }cLRn ≤=Γ )(:ˆ γγ .  Assuming homoscedasticity, 
CP →Γ∈ )ˆ( 0γ  as ∞→n , therefore, Γˆ  is the asymptotic C-level confidence region 
for γ .  If the homoscedasticity condition is not fulfilled, then a scale likelihood ratio 
statistics of the residual sum of squared errors is defined as: 
 
222
*
ˆˆ
)ˆ()(
ˆ
)()( ησ
γγ
η
γγ nnnn SSLRLR −==       (10) 
 
and the adjusted confidence region becomes })(:{ˆ ** cLRn ≤=Γ γγ  such that *Γˆ  is 
robust whether or not the heteroscedasticity condition holds.  Simulation is set at 1000 
replications as suggested by Hansen (2000).  Also, )(* γnLR  is not normally distributed 
hence, the valid  asymptotic confidence intervals of the estimated threshold values in 
the no-rejection areas defined as αα −−−= 11ln(2)(c , where α is a given 
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asymptotic level; and the no- rejection region of the confidence interval is α−1 .  If 
)()( 01 αγ cLR ≤ , than the null hypothesis of 00 : γγ =H cannot be rejected.  In 
addition, to examine the possibility of a second threshold value, the same exercise is 
repeated.  Specifically, the empirical model to be tested which is based on equation 
(2) is defined as follows: 
 
ttttttt ZMRMisK εββββα +++++= 4321 3     (11) 
 
where K is capital inflows, Mis, R and M3 denote exchange rate misalignment, 
interest differentials and financial deepening, and Z represents the other control 
variables.  Table 1 summarizes the description of data, measurement and sources used 
in this study. 
 
Table 1: Determinants of Capital Inflows (1991Q1-2008Q3) 
Variable Description Measurement Source 
I Foreign investment Total foreign investment inflow as a percentage 
of GDP  
BNM 
M3 Money supply M2 as a percentage of GDP IFS 
D Government deficit The difference between revenue and expenditure 
as a percentage of GDP 
BNM 
R Interest differential The difference between Malaysia and US 3-
month T-Bill rates 
IFS 
T Taxation Government corporate tax revenue as a 
percentage of GDP 
BNM 
LL Liquid Liability Log International liquidity: banking institution 
liability, line. 7b.d 
IFS 
INFRA Infrastructure Log of spending on infrastructure as a percentage 
of GDP 
BNM 
IFS: International Financial Statistics, IMF, UNCTAD: United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, BNM: Bank Negara Malaysia Monthly Statistical BulletinDOS: Department of Statistics, 
Malaysia (various issues). 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Prior to time series analysis, we test for unit roots in order to avoid spurious 
regression.  Three versions of unit root testing, namely the ADF, PP and KPSS tests 
are employed to examine whether the variables are stationary on level or otherwise.  
Table 3 indicates that the order of integration are mixed for a majority of variables.  
However, this study proceeds to examine the threshold effect by including lagged 
variables for I(1) variables in the OLS estimation.  Moreover, equation (2) derived 
from the theory requires estimations at level. 
 
Table 2: Unit root test 
 ADF PP KPSS Order of 
Integration  Level 1st Diff Level 1st Diff Level 1st Diff 
I -3.7029* -7.9812* -3.5286* --14.00208 0.9008* 0.2305 I(0)/I(1) 
M3 -1.2741 -10.0951* -1.3334 -10.4699* 1.0229* 0.3588*** I(1) 
D -1.6297 -19.7087* -8.8219* -27.3774* 0.3649* 0.0894 I(0)/I(1) 
R -4.5405* -3.8179** -2.6509 -7.0649* 0.0711 0.0471 I(0)/I(1) 
INFRA -2.2527 -4.5270* -3.5053* -27.7776* 0.2234* 0.0813 I(0)/I(1) 
LL -3.0805 -6.5500* -2.4386 -6.7355* 0.1073 0.0607 I(0)/I(1) 
MIS -3.8075** -9.7442* -3.8076** -9.8483* 0.0662 0.0577 I(0) 
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% significant level. p-values are in 
parentheses.  For ADF and PP test the null is no unit root (H0: Variable is stationary) whilst the null 
for the KPSS is the existence of unit root (H0: Variable is not stationary). 
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The baseline regression constitutes the exchange rate misalignment, interest 
differential and a measure of financial development, M3.  We present four additional 
models with different variables added to the baseline regression, namely liquid 
liability, government budget deficit, and infrastructure for sensitivity analysis.  
Hansen (2000) theoretical construct allows for two threshold effects, hence, the first 
step is to investigate the possible existence of such an effect.  Prior to that, a threshold 
variable needs to be selected.  Since the aim of this section is to examine at what 
percentage exchange rate misalignment actually hurts capital inflows, the appropriate 
threshold variable is the exchange rate misalignment.   
 
Upon choosing the appropriate threshold variable, the next step is to observe any 
evidence of a threshold effect and whether there exist one or more threshold by 
employing the heteroscedasticity-consistent Lagrange-multiplier (LM) test for a 
threshold based on Hansen (1996).   To test γ  under the null hypothesis of no 
threshold effect, p-values are calculated using a bootstrap analog which generates the 
dependent variable from the distribution )ˆ,0( 2teN , where teˆ  is the OLS residuals from 
the estimated threshold model.  With 1000 bootstrap replications, the p-values for the 
baseline threshold models (Table 3) using misalignment strongly suggest the 
existence of threshold effect at 0.000.  Subsequently, this suggests that there is a 
sample split based on the effect of exchange rate misalignment.   
 
Table 3: Threshold Effects for the baseline model 
                   Model 1 
First Sample Split 
F-Stats 51.4045 
Bootstrap P-Value 0.000 
Threshold Estimates -15.0260% 
95% Confidence Interval -15.446% , -9.8360% 
Second Sample Split 
F-Stats                  16.2171 
Bootstrap P-Value                   0.2890 
Note: H0: No threshold effect.  The threshold is based on the minimized sum of squared residuals. 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the graph of the normalized likelihood ratio sequence )(* γnLR  as a 
function of the threshold in exchange rate misalignment.  The estimated γ  is the value 
which minimizes these graphs which range at γˆ =15.02-15.44%.  The dotted lines on 
the graphs present the 95% critical values.  For example, in model 1, the asymptotic 
95% confidence interval set %]84.9%,03.15[ˆ * −−=Γ  where )(* γnLR  crosses the 
dotted lines.  The results suggest that there is ample evidence for a two-regime 
specification.  Also, it is worth noting that 41 of the 71 observations fall into the 95% 
confidence interval, hence, requires an examination of the possible existence of a 
second sample split.  Results in Table 3, show that second sample split renders 
insignificant bootstrap p-value thus, indicating no further regime split. 
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Figure 2: First Sample Split – Confidence Interval Construction for Threshold   
 
 
Table 4 presents the results for baseline regression.  For comparison purposes, this 
study provides the linear OLS model without the threshold effect and a two-regime 
model which accommodates the threshold effect.  Basically, the variables confer the 
correct signs in line with the prediction of the theory.  Misalignment has a negative 
and significant effect on capital inflows in regime 2.  Interest differential is expected 
to confer a negative effect.  Results indicate that interest differentials only affects 
capital inflows negatively in the regime 1 but is insignificant in the regime 2.  
Similarly, M3 has significant effect in both regime but is positive in the regime 1 but 
the sign switches in regime 2.  Hence, splitting the sample gives a more indepth view 
of the effects of these basic variables on investment inflows.  To reiterate, sample 
splitting allows the examination of whether the significant effect is present in both 
regimes or otherwise. 
 
The results show that below the threshold value of 15%, exchange rate misalignment 
may be negative but are not statistically significant.  However, above the 15% 
threshold level, misalignment exerts both negative and significant impact on capital 
inflows.  A 1% increase in misalignment (overvaluation) suppresses capital inflows 
by approximately 1.19%.  The negative effect of exchange rate misalignment on 
capital inflows is consistent with the findings of Hasnat (1999).  Barrel and Pain 
(1996) argue that an apparent currency misalignment persistent over some length of 
time may affect investment inflows decisions.  A reasonable explanation is that the 
relative production costs may be higher as a result of such misalignment.  If the 
ringgit is thought to be overvalued relative to its estimated equilibrium level, then 
foreign production may be discouraged by the prospect of future capital loss in home 
currency terms. 
 
Another issue which emerges after the 1997 financial crisis is that capital inflows 
must be managed since reversals are likely to cause severe damage to the economy.  
Reinhart and Reinhart (1998) calls for greater exchange rate flexibility which is meant 
to introduce two-way risks, therefore, discouraging speculative capital inflows.  It is, 
however, only possible in the context of de facto peg or a tightly managed float.  
Furthermore, the effectiveness of this policy depends on how much policymakers are 
willing to allow the exchange rate to fluctuate.  A large band denotes greater 
flexibility but risks having large nominal appreciation which connotes possible 
overvaluation of the currency.  The result of this study suggests that overvaluation is 
detrimental to capital inflows if this band exceeds 15%.  Hence, policymakers should 
keep exchange rate fluctuations well below this 15% threshold. 
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Table 4: Baseline regression results on the effect of misalignment on capital inflows 
(1991:Q1-2008:Q3).  Dependent variable is capital inflows. 
Model 1 Linear Model Threshold Model 
OLS without threshold Regime 1 ≤  15.0259% Regime 2 > 15.0259% 
Misalignment -0.4267** 
(0.2115) 
-0.3186 
(0.2573) 
-1.1955** 
(0.5712) 
Interest Differential -0.0250*** 
(0.0131) 
-0.0438* 
(0.01533) 
-0.0261 
(0.0193) 
M3 0.2964* 
(0.0391) 
0.2644* 
(0.0516) 
-0.5560* 
(0.1240) 
Constant  3.0468* 
(0.2779) 
2.5394* 
(0.2593) 
6.7313* 
(0.6099) 
No. of Observations 71 42 29 
R2 0.3664 0.6484 0.4218 
    
Notes: *, ** and *** denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance respectively. Standard errors in 
parentheses. 
 
Interest rate differential are consistently negative and significant in all specifications 
and in both regimes in majority of the threshold model.  This stresses the role of 
interest rates in attracting capital inflows into Malaysia.  Although the impact may be 
small, it is significant and the authorities should ensure that interest rates are kept at 
certain levels to maintain competitiveness of Malaysia as destination for capital 
investment.  In this paper, the estimated impact of a 1% change in interest differential 
is expected to subdue foreign investment by 0.04 percentage point in the first regime 
and 0.03 percentage point in the second regime.  The proxy for financial deepening, 
M3 is statistically significant in all models and in both regimes.  Again, this signifies 
the importance of financial development in attracting capital investment into 
Malaysia.  Interestingly, M3 is positive during the periods of low misalignment 
regime (regime 1) but becomes negative at higher misalignment regime (regime 2).  
During low misalignment, a 1% increase in M3 is expected to draw in 0.3 percentage 
point more investment inflow into Malaysia.  This shows that in the lower regime, 
financial depth acts as an impetus to capital inflows.  However, the situation reverse 
with 0.6 percentage point lower investment inflows is expected with a 1% increase in 
misalignment in the second threshold regime.  Montiel (1999) explicitly explains this 
phenomenon where capital inflows increase reserves which then prompt an increase in 
the monetary base, M2 and M3.  Such increases fuels further increments in domestic 
demand leading to real appreciation.  Thus, any overvaluation of the currency may 
eventually have negative ramifications on capital inflows. 
 
Sensitivity analysis 
To check for the sensitivity of the estimated threshold value, Table 6 -7 and Figure 3 
represents four other models which use different variables in addition to the baseline 
regression.  The addition of taxes yields insignificant results without drastically 
changing the threshold value.  Other additional variables such as government budget 
deficit and liquid liability are only significant in one of the two regimes1.  With the 
inclusion of additional variables, the estimated magnitude of each regressors differ 
slightly but maintains the same sign and significance level.  For example a 1% 
                                                 
1 Inclusion of other variables namely openness, real effective exchange rate, bilateral rates between 
Malaysia and US, inflation, volatility and lagged variables of I(1) regressors yield mostly insignificant 
results, hence not are reported.   Results are available upon request. 
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increase in misalignment (overvaluation) suppresses capital inflows by 1.11-1.55 
percentage point.  The estimated impact of a 1% change in interest differential is 
expected to deter foreign investment by 0.04-0.05 percentage point in the first regime 
and 0.02-0.06 percentage point in the second regime.  Similarly, during low 
misalignment, a 1% increase in M3 is expected to draw in 0.2-0.3 percentage point 
more investment inflow into Malaysia.  An estimated 0.49-0.67 percentage point 
lower investment inflows is expected with a 1% increase in M3 in the second 
threshold regime.   
 
In view of the results, it seems evident that the exchange rate policy has important 
effect in attracting foreign capital inflows into Malaysia.  Specifically, misalignment 
in terms of overvaluation should be kept lower than 15 percent to ensure that capital 
inflows remained unhurt. 
 
Figure 3:  Sensitivity Analysis: First Sample Split - Confidence Interval Construction 
for Threshold 
Model 2     Model 3 
               
Model 4     Model 5 
            
 
 
 
Table 5: Sensitivity Analysis: Threshold Effects 
 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
First Sample Split 
F-Stats 71.1442 45.9364 53.3722 53.3722 
Bootstrap P-Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Threshold Estimates -15.4461% -15.0260% -15.0260% -15.0260% 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
-15.446%, -
15.025% 
-15.446%, -
9.836% 
-15.446%, -
0.0984% 
-15.446%, -
0.0984% 
Second Sample Split 
F-Stats 16.4917 19.7585 22.9710 22.9710 
Bootstrap P-Value 0.5310 0.3800 0.2420 0.2420 
Note: H0: No threshold effect.  The threshold is based on the minimized sum of squared residuals 
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Table 6:  Sensitivity Analysis for threshold estimates (1991:Q1-2008:Q3).   
Model 2 Linear Model Threshold Model 
OLS without threshold Regime 1 ≤  15.4461% Regime 2 > 15.4461% 
Misalignment -0.4278*** 
(0.2216) 
-0.3497 
(0.4143) 
-1.5593* 
(0.3135) 
Interest Differential -0.0250*** 
(0.0134) 
-0.0462* 
(0.0153) 
-0.0599* 
(0.0131) 
M3 0.2966* 
(0.0414) 
0.2732* 
(0.0488) 
-0.5609* 
(0.0744) 
Liquid Liability -0.0029 
(0.1709) 
-0.0634 
(0.1932) 
1.1843* 
(0.2615) 
Constant  2.9780* 
(0.2713) 
2.5259* 
(0.2593) 
6.1799* 
(0.3135) 
No. of Observations 71 41 30 
R2 0.3842 0.6503 0.5986 
Model 3 Linear Model Threshold Model 
OLS without threshold Regime 1 ≤  15.0260% Regime 2 > 15.0260% 
Misalignment -0.4472** 
(0.2038) 
-0.3800 
(0.2460) 
-1.1171*** 
(0.6229) 
Interest Differential -0.0254* 
(0.0126) 
-0.0505* 
(0.0140) 
-0.0237 
(0.0221) 
M3 0.2844* 
(7.4922) 
0.2521* 
(0.0472) 
-0.5391* 
(0.1477) 
Deficit -0.7655* 
(0.3059) 
-0.7380* 
(0.3099) 
-0.1841 
(0.7174) 
Constant  3.0308* 
(0.2674) 
2.5835* 
(0.2445) 
6.6452* 
(0.7337) 
No. of Observations 71 42 29 
R2 0.4285 0.6829 0.4230 
Model 4 Linear Model Threshold Model 
OLS without threshold Regime 1 ≤  15.0260% Regime 2 > 15.0260% 
Misalignment -0.2852 
(0.2181) 
-0.2582 
(0.2720) 
1.2490** 
(0.5612) 
Interest Differential -0.0275** 
(0.0128) 
-0.0419* 
(0.0165) 
-0.0311 
(0.0204) 
M3 0.3208* 
(0.0401) 
0.2796* 
(0.0583) 
-0.5489* 
(0.1245) 
Tax 2.1899** 
(1.0761) 
0.1283 
(0.1457) 
0.1260 
(0.1720) 
Constant  3.0274* 
(0.4383) 
2.2463* 
(0.4806) 
6.5027* 
(0.7227) 
No. of Observations 71 42 29 
R2 0.3665 0.6516 0.4300 
Model 5 Linear Model Threshold Model 
OLS without threshold Regime 1 ≤  15.0260% Regime 2 > 15.0260% 
Misalignment -0.3780*** 
(0.1977) 
-0.4495*** 
(0.2602) 
-1.3190** 
(0.6059) 
Interest Differential -0.0203 
(0.0123)
-0.0433* 
(0.0152)
-0.0308 
(0.0212) 
M3 0.2941* 
(0.0365) 
0.2388* 
(0.0479) 
-0.6093* 
(0.1406) 
Infrastructure 3.0729* 
(3.3373) 
0.0474** 
(0.0228) 
-0.0382 
(0.0392) 
Constant  3.0709* 
(0.2569) 
2.5698* 
(0.2346) 
7.0433* 
(0.7173) 
No. of Observations 71 42 29 
R2 0.4091 0.6815 0.4384 
Notes: *, ** and *** denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance respectively.  Standard errors in 
parentheses. 
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CONCLUSION 
The objective of this chapter is to examine the impact of exchange rate misalignment 
on capital inflows.  Results provide evidences of the negative impact of misalignment 
on capital inflows.  To reiterate, overvaluation of the ringgit signals that Malaysia is 
less competitive vis-à-vis other countries.  In addition, this paper also estimates a 
specific threshold value; that is the degree of misalignment after which it begins to 
hurt capital inflows.  By employing a recent technique by Hansen (1996, 2000), this 
study splits the sample into high misalignment and low misalignment regimes.  This 
study shows that misalignments hurt capital inflows in the high misalignment regime 
or when misalignment is greater than 15 percent.  This study also confirms the work 
of Goh (2005) who suggests that the portfolio balance model can capture the 
determinants of capital inflows in Malaysia.  In particular, the results suggest that 
interest differential is an important determinant albeit, small, hence, policies should be 
directed into maintaining a certain level of competitive interest rates.  Furthermore, it 
is evident that financial deepening plays an important role to attract capital inflows.  
Finally, it is important that the Malaysian authorities continue to intervene the 
exchange rate and to keep overvaluation at its minimum. 
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